

**Seminar in World Political Economy**  
**Political Science 668 (Fall 2020)**  
**Mondays, 1:10pm-4:10pm EST**  
**Distance Learning/Combined**

Instructor: Katja B. Kleinberg  
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Office Hours: Via Zoom by appointment

**OVERVIEW**

This seminar aims to provide an overview of classic analyses and current research in the subfield of international political economy. Work in this subfield explores the interactions between politics and the cross-border flows of goods and capital. By the end of the semester, students will be familiar with major concepts and approaches found in the literature. In addition to a systematic discussion of the role of power, domestic and international institutions, and organized interests in economic policymaking, the readings for this course are designed to give students a historical perspective on the development of the world economy. This is an advanced graduate seminar. Students are expected to have taken the core graduate seminar, or its equivalent, and should have some familiarity with quantitative research methods in political science. Some knowledge of international economics is desirable but not a prerequisite. Many of the recommended readings for each week and the recommended introductory text in international economics can provide background information if you require it.

**COURSE MATERIALS**

Most of the course readings are journal articles which are available online and can be accessed through the BU library. Readings not readily available online will be provided by the instructor. The following book is required for this course.

- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

The following books are recommended. They are designed to provide background on the field of IPE as an intellectual endeavor, economic concepts, and the history of the international economy.

- Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld. 2008. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*, 8th Edition. Boston, MA: Pearson.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2020. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 2008 [1998]. *Globalizing Capital*. 2nd Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rogoff, Kenneth S., and Carmen M. Reinhart. *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Aliber. 2005. *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*. 5th Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley&Sons.
- Blyth, Mark. 2013. *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

## COURSE EXPECTATIONS

**Attendance and Class Participation.** Full attendance is expected. Active participation is vitally important for the success of the seminar as well as for your final grade.

Class discussions will be held via Zoom; a recurring meeting will be set up and the link posted on the seminar's MyCourses page under Announcement.

**Discussion Leadership.** Each student will lead the class discussion twice during the semester. This role entails two responsibilities:

- Discussion leaders will briefly (no more than 5 minutes) introduce the week's topic at the beginning of class. Introductory comments should outline the "big questions" addressed in that week's readings; they are NOT intended to summarize the readings.
- Discussion leaders will prepare 4-5 questions about the readings designed to facilitate in-class discussion. These questions should be emailed to all students in the seminar **by 8am on Monday before each class.**

**Critical Reviews/Idea Papers.** Students will prepare **three** idea papers over the course of the semester. Based on the week's topic, a critical review/idea paper should:

- Identify one research question addressed in one or more of the readings;
- Provide a **very brief** critique of the theoretical argument(s) and/or empirical method used in the reading(s) to answer the research question;
- Outline an alternative theoretical argument and/or research design that could further our understanding of the topic;
- Not exceed six pages (double-spaced).

**Research Design.** Students may prepare a paper developing an original idea that could serve as the basis for a publishable article-length manuscript. Your original idea can be a theoretical innovation or an improvement in the research design. Regardless of the nature of your original idea, your paper should note an empirical puzzle and draw on the relevant literature to outline the research question, develop a clear argument for your innovation, elaborate at least one testable hypothesis, and outline a method for testing the hypothesis empirically. Papers are due on December 10, 2020 and must be submitted through **Turnitin**.

**Final Exam.** As an alternative to the Research Design option, students may choose to take a final exam. The exam will be take-home, open-book, and modeled on the format of the written comprehensive examinations. You will have some choice among questions. The questions will be distributed electronically on Tuesday, December 8, 2020. You will have until Thursday, December 10, to submit your answers through **Turnitin** but you should work no more than 8 hours on composing your answers.

## GRADING

Your final course grade is calculated as follows:

Participation & Discussion Leadership:	35%
Critical Reviews:	30%
Research Design OR Final Exam:	35%

## DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION

Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) provides a wide range of assistance to enrolled students with physical, learning or other disabilities. If you have a disability and need classroom accommodations, please contact Services for Students with Disabilities, Phone: 607-777-2686 voice/TTY), Fax 607-777-6893. Email: [bjfairba@binghamton.edu](mailto:bjfairba@binghamton.edu).

## ACADEMIC HONESTY

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. All work submitted in this course must be original work. Sources must be properly cited. Any and all instances of academic dishonesty will result in a failing grade (F) for the course.

## PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE OF READINGS

Please note that I reserve the right to add or change readings with adequate prior notice.

### 1. Introduction (August 31)

Required:

- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. [entire, excluding the appendices]
- Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-2.
- Ruggie, John G. 1982. International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. *International Organization* 36(2): 379-415.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics* 28(3): 317-47.

Recommended:

- Lake, David. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *Review of International Organizations* 4(3): 219-44.
- Oatley, Thomas. 2011. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization* 65(2): 311-41.
- Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin. 1999. Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? NBER Working Paper No. 7195.
- Helleiner, Eric. 2019. The Life and Times of Embedded Liberalism: Legacies and Innovations since Bretton Woods. *Review of International Political Economy* 26(6): 1112-1135.

### 2. Interests, Institutions, and International Trade I (September 7)

Required:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-37.

Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2009. What Governments Maximize and Why: A View from Trade. *International Organization* 63(3): 491-532.

Fordham, Benjamin O., and Timothy J. McKeown. 2003. Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Votes on Trade Policy. *International Organization* 57 (3):519-49.

Kim, In Song. 2017. Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 1-20.

Madeira, Mary Anne. 2016. New Trade, New Politics: Intra-Industry Trade and Domestic Political Coalitions. *Review of International Political Economy* 23(4): 677-711.

Betz, Timm, and Amy Pond. 2019. The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 81(2): 585-600.

Recommended:

Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833-50.

Bernard, Andrew B. et al. 2007. Firms in International Trade. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3): 105-30.

Ahlquist, John S., Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle. *International Organization* 68(1): 33-75.

### 3. Looking for Microfoundations (September 14)

Required:

Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy. 2014. Special issue of *International Interactions* 40(3). Read:

Pepinsky, Thomas B. Surveys, Experiments, and the Landscape of International Political Economy.

Tingley, Dustin. Survey Research in International Political Economy: Motivations, Designs, Methods.

Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others? *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393-1430.

Erica Owen, Noel P. Johnston. 2017. Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment. *International Organization* 71(4): 665-699.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable? *International Organization* 63(3): 533-57.

Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization* 71(S1): 1-30.

Recommended:

Osgood, Iain, Dustin Tingley, Thomas Bernauer, In Song Kim, Helen V. Milner, and Gabriele Spilker. 2017. The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy. *Journal of Politics* 79(1): 133-151.

- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Outgroup Anxiety. *International Organization* 63(3): 425-57.
- Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade? *International Organization* 66(2): 311-28.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924-938.
- Bechtel, Michael M., Thomas Bernauer, and Reto Meyer. 2012. The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences. *Review of International Political Economy* 19(5): 837-66.
- Beesley, Celeste. 2020. Foreign Policy Preferences in Ukraine: Trade and Ethnolinguistic Identity. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1): 35-44.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Stephan Haggard, David A. Lake, David G. Victor. 2017. The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations. *International Organization* 71(S1): S1-S31.
- Counterpoint in the same issue: Powell, Robert. Research Bets and Behavioral IR. Pages S265-277.

#### 4. Interests, Institutions, and International Trade II (September 21)

##### Required:

- Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-98.
- Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49(3): 309-38.
- Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59 (1):157-93.
- Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-84.
- Chow, Wilfred Ming, Daniel Yuichi Kono. 2017. Entry, Vulnerability, and Trade Policy: Why Some Autocrats Like International Trade. *International Studies Quarterly* 61(4): 892–906.
- Ezrow, Lawrence, Timothy Hellwig, and Michele Fenzl. 2020. Responsiveness, If You Can Afford It: Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times. *Journal of Politics* 82(3): 1166-1170.

##### Recommended:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Trade and Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organization* 41(2): 203-23.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

## 5. International Institutions and Trade (September 28)

### Required:

Davis, Christina L. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153-69.

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55(4): 829-57.

Bearce, David H., Cody D. Eldredge, and Brandy J. Jolliff. 2016. Does Institutional Design Matter? A Study of Trade Effectiveness and PTA Flexibility/Rigidity. *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2): 307-316.

Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 68(4): 877-911.

Chaudoin, Stephen, Jeffrey Kucik, Krzysztof Pelc. 2016. Do WTO Disputes Actually Increase Trade? *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2): 294-306.

Allee, Todd, Manfred Elsig. 2019. Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied and Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(3): 603-613.

### Recommended:

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56(3): 477-513.

Kucik, Jeffrey. 2012. The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences over Trade Agreement Rules. *Economic & Politics* 24(2): 95-118.

Rose, Andrew, K. 2004. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.

Peacock, Claire, Karolina Milewicz, Duncan Snidal. 2019. Boilerplate in International Trade Agreements. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(4): 923-637.

## 6. Foreign Direct Investment (October 5)

### Required:

Kerner, Andrew. 2014. What We Talk about When We Talk about Foreign Direct Investment. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4): 804-15.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1994. International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation. *International Organization* 48(4): 559-93.

Neilson, Jeffrey, Bill Pritchard, and Henry Wai-chung Yeung. 2014. Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks in the Changing International Political Economy: An Introduction. *Review of International Political Economy* 21(1): 1-8.

Osgood, Iain. 2018. Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 72(2): 455-484.

Li, Quan, Erica Owen, and Austin Mitchell. 2018. Why Do Democracies Attract More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Metaregression Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly* 62(3): 494-504.

Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 662-674.

Zhu, Boliang, and Weiyi Shi. 2019. Greasing the Wheels of Commerce? Corruption and Foreign Investment. *Journal of Politics* 81(4): 1311-1327.

Recommended:

Dunning, John H., and Sarianna M. Lundan. 2008. *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*. 2nd Edition. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Jensen, Nathan. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries. *International Organization* 57(1): 175-211.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization* 60(4): 811-846.

Pinto, Pablo M., and Boliang Zhu. 2016. Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward Foreign Direct Investment on Corruption. *International Studies Quarterly* 60(4): 693-705.

## 7. Exchange Rates (October 12)

Required:

Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan Taylor. 2017. International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31(3): 3-28.

Broz, J. Lawrence, and Jeffrey Frieden. 2006. The Political Economy of Exchange Rates. In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pages 587-597.

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2008. Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data. *IMF Staff Papers* 55: 417-444.

Broz, J. Lawrence, and Seth H. Werfel. 2014. Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection. *International Organization* 68(2): 393-416.

Betz, Timm, and Andrew Kerner. 2016. Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and WTO Dispute Initiation in Developing Countries. *International Organization* 70(4): 797-821.

Meissner, Christopher. 2005. A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold Standard, 1870-1913. *Journal of International Economics* 66(2): 385-406.

Recommended:

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2014. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Eichengreen, Barry. 2008. *Globalizing Capital* (2nd Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Simmons, Beth A. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

McNamara, Kathleen R. 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Helleiner, Eric. 2003. *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Ahamed, Liaquat. 2009. *Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Walter, Stephanie. 2008. A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences. *International Organization* 62(3): 405-438.

## **8. Capital Mobility and Macroeconomic Policy (October 19)**

Required:

Quinn, Dennis, and Carla Inclan. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 771-813.

Kastner, Scott L., and Chad Rector. 2005. Partisanship and the Path to Financial Openness. *Comparative Political Studies* 38(5): 484-506.

Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.

Avelino, George, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter. 2005. The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 625-41.

Scheve, Kenneth. 2004. Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking. *International Organization* 58(1): 1-34.

Hellwig, Timothy. 2014. Balancing Demands: The World Economy and the Composition of Policy Preferences. *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 1-14.

Recommended:

Goodman, John B., and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. *World Politics* 46(1): 50-82.

Haggard, Stephen, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World. *International Organization* 50(1): 35-68.

Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (3): 1003-27.

Quinn, Dennis, and Maria Toyoda. 2007. Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 344-63.

Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. 2003. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization* 57(2): 307-36.

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2010. Growth in a Time of Debt. NBER Working Paper No. 15639. Read in combination with: Cassidy, John. 2013. The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up. *The New Yorker*, April 26.

## 9. Borrowing, Lending, Debt (October 26)

Required:

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. *International Organization* 57(1): 3-42.

Oatley, Thomas. 2010. Political Institutions and Foreign Debt in the Developing World. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 175-95.

Kaplan, Stephen B., and Kaj Thomsson. 2017. The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Global Finance and Electoral Cycles. *Journal of Politics* 79(2): 605-623.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54(4): 737-773.

DiGiuseppe, Matthew, and Patrick E. Shea. 2015. Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders: Reassessing the “Democratic Advantage.” *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 557-70.

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2016. Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default. *International Organization* 70(2): 313-46.

Recommended:

Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. *Global Capital and National Governments*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

## 10. Economic Crisis and Reform (November 2)

Required:

Danzman, Sarah Bauerle, W. Kindred Winecoff, Thomas Oatley. 2017. All Crises are Global: Capital Cycles in an Imbalanced International Political Economy. *International Studies Quarterly* 61(4): 907-923.

Oatley, Thomas. 2004. Why is Stabilization Sometimes Delayed? Re-evaluating the Regime Type Hypothesis. *Comparative Political Studies* 37(3): 286-312.

Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winners Take All. *World Politics* 50(2): 203-34. Schamis, Hector. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics* 51(2): 236-68.

Schamis, Hector. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics* 51(2): 236-68.

Henisz, Witold J., and Edward D Mansfield. 2019. The Political Economy of Financial Reform: de Jure Liberalization vs. de Facto Implementation. *International Studies Quarterly* 63(3): 589-602.

Schneider, Christina J., and Jennifer L. Tobin. 2020. The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts. *International Organization* 74(1): 1-29.

Recommended:

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2008. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. 2000. The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 62(2): 385-421.

Lipsy, Phillip Y. 2018. Democracy and Financial Crisis. *International Organization* 72(4): 937-968.

Alesina, Alberto, and Alan Drazen. 1991. Why are Stabilizations Delayed? *American Economic Review* 81(5): 1170-88.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2005. Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 479-96.

Bechtel, Michael M., Jens Hainmueller, and Yotam Margalit. 2014. Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 835- 56.

## 11. Economic Development, Commerce, and the State (November 9)

Required:

Bruton, Henry J. 1998. A Reconsideration of Import Substitution. *Journal of Economic Literature* 36(2): 903-936.

Cheng, Tun-jen. 1990. Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan. In Gereffi, Gary, and Donald L. Wyman (Eds.). *Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and Asia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hays, Jude, Sean Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt, 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis. *International Organization* 59 (2):473-94.

Babic, Milan, Javier Garcia-Bernardo, and Eelke M. Heemskerk. 2019. The Rise of Transnational State Capital: State-led Foreign Investment in the 21st Century. *Review of International Political Economy* 27(3): 433-475.

Helleiner, Eric. 2002. Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century. *International Studies Quarterly* 46(3): 307-329.

Recommended:

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115-131.

Colantone, Italo, and Piero Stanig. 2018. The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4): 936-953.

Owen, Erica, and Stefanie Walter. 2017. Open Economy Politics and Brexit: Insights, Puzzles, and Ways Forward. *Review of International Political Economy* 24(2): 179-202.

## 12. Foreign Aid (November 16)

Required:

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. 2017. Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World. *International Organization* 74(4): 735-766.

Briggs, Ryan C. 2017. Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest? *International Organization* 71(1): 187-206.

Dietrich, Simone, Minhaj Mahmud, and Matthew S. Winters. 2018. Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy, and Domestic Government Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh. *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 133-148.

Malik, Rabia, and Randall W. Stone. 2018. Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending. *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 103-118.

Dietrich, Simone. 2016. Donor Political Economies and the Pursuit of Aid Effectiveness. *International Organization* 70(1): 65-102.

Girod, Desha M., Jennifer L. Tobin. 2016. Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements. *International Organization* 70(1): 209-239.

Recommended:

McKeown, Timothy J. 2016. A Different Two-Level Game: Foreign Policy Officials' Personal Networks and Coordinated Policy Innovation. *Review of International Political Economy* 23(1): 93-122.

Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. *World Politics* 52(1): 38-75.

Stone, Randall. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. *International Organization* 62(4): 589-620.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. The United States Congress and IMF Financing, 1944-2009. *The Review of International Organizations* 6(3-4): 341-68.

Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. 2012. Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis. *International Organization* 66(2): 329-58.

## 13. Migration (November 30)

Required:

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization. *World Politics* 67(1): 114-54.

Holland, Alisha C., and Margaret E. Peters. 2020. Explaining Migration Timing: Political Information and Opportunities. *International Organization* 74(3): 560-583.

Facchini, Giovanni, and Max Friedrich Steinhardt. 2011. What Drives U.S. Immigration Policy? Evidence from Congressional Roll Call Votes. *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7-8): 734-743.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. Public Attitudes toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 225-49.

Rueda, David. 2018. Food Comes First, Then Morals: Redistribution Preferences, Parochial Altruism, and Immigration in Western Europe. *Journal of Politics* 80(1): 225-239.

Singer, David A. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 307-323.

Recommended:

Aggarwala, Reena, Asli Demirgüç-Kuntb, and Maria Soledad Martínez Períab. 2011. Do Remittances Promote Financial Development? *Journal of Development Economics* 96(2): 255-64.

Leblang, David A., Jennifer Fitzgerald, and Jessica Teets. 2014. Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration. *World Politics* 66(3): 406-45.

Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

#### 14. Commerce & Violent Conflict (December 7)

Required:

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. [entire, focus especially on chapter 2]

Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 2018. Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean. *International Studies Quarterly* 62(2): 383-395.

Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998. Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 418-39.

McDonald, Patrick. 2004. Peace Through Trade or Free Trade? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 547-72.

Barry, Colin M. 2018. Peace and Conflict at Different Stages of the FDI Lifecycle. *Review of International Political Economy* 25(2): 270-292.

Bearce, David, and Sawa Omori. 2005. How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? *Journal of Peace Research* 42(6): 659-78.

Recommended:

Baldwin, David A. 1985. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Morrow, James D. 1999. How Could Trade Affect Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 481-89.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian M. Pollins (Eds.). 2003. *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.