

**Seminar in World Political Economy  
Political Science 668 (Spring 2018)  
Fridays, 9:40am-12:40pm, Academic Building B 113**

Instructor: Katja B. Kleinberg  
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Office Hours: Thursdays 8:30-11:30am  
and by appointment

### OVERVIEW

This seminar aims to provide an overview of classic analyses and current research in the subfield of international political economy. Work in this subfield explores the interactions between politics and the cross-border flows of goods and capital. By the end of the semester, students will be familiar with major concepts and approaches found in the literature. In addition to a systematic discussion of the role of power, domestic and international institutions, and organized interests in economic policymaking, the readings for this course are designed to give students a historical perspective on the development of the world economy. This is an advanced graduate seminar. Students are expected to have taken the core graduate seminar, or its equivalent, and should have some familiarity with quantitative research methods in political science. Some knowledge of international economics is desirable but not a prerequisite. Many of the recommended readings for each week and the recommended introductory text in international economics can provide background information if you require it.

### COURSE MATERIALS

Most of the course readings are journal articles which are available online and can be accessed through the BU library. Readings not readily available online will be provided by the instructor. The following books are required for this course.

- Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2014. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

The following books are recommended. They are designed to provide background on economic concepts and the history of the international economy.

- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2006. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 2008 [1998]. *Globalizing Capital*. 2nd Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld. 2008. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*, 8th Edition. Boston, MA: Pearson.
- Rogoff, Kenneth S., and Carmen M. Reinhart. *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Kindleberger, Charles P., and Robert Aliber. 2005. *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises*. 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley&Sons.
- Blyth, Mark. 2013. *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

## COURSE EXPECTATIONS

**Attendance and Class Participation.** Full attendance is expected. Active participation is vitally important for the success of the seminar as well as for your final grade.

**Discussion Leadership.** Each student will lead the class discussion twice during the semester. Specifically, for each week a team of two students will serve as discussion leaders. This role entails two responsibilities:

- Discussion leaders will briefly (no more than 5 minutes) introduce the week’s topic at the beginning of class. Introductory comments should outline the “big questions” addressed in that week’s readings; they are NOT intended to summarize the readings.
- Discussion leaders will prepare 4-5 questions about the readings designed to facilitate in-class discussion. These questions should be emailed to all students in the seminar **by 8am on Friday before each class**.

**Critical Reviews/Idea Papers.** Students will prepare **two** idea papers over the course of the semester. Based on the week’s topic, a critical review/idea paper should:

- Identify one research question addressed in one or more of the readings;
- Provide a **very brief** critique of the theoretical argument(s) and/or empirical method used in the reading(s) to answer the research question;
- Outline an alternative theoretical argument and/or research design that could further our understanding of the topic;
- Not exceed six pages (double-spaced).

**Research Design.** Students may prepare a paper developing an original idea that could serve as the basis for a publishable article-length manuscript. Your original idea can be a theoretical innovation or an improvement in the research design. Regardless of the nature of your original idea, your paper should note an empirical puzzle and draw on the relevant literature to outline the research question, develop a clear argument for your innovation, elaborate at least one testable hypothesis, and outline a method for testing the hypothesis empirically. Papers are due on Friday, May 11, 2018 and must be submitted through **Turnitin**.

**Final Exam.** As an alternative to the Research Design option, students may choose to take a final exam. The exam will be take-home, open-book, and modeled on the format of the written comprehensive examinations. You will have some choice among questions. The questions will be distributed electronically on Wednesday, May 9, 2018. You will have until Friday, May 11, to submit your answers through **Turnitin** but you should work no more than 8 hours on composing your answers.

## GRADING

Your final course grade is calculated as follows:

Participation & Discussion Leadership:	35%
Critical Reviews:	20%
Research Design OR Final Exam:	45%

## DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION

Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) provides a wide range of assistance to enrolled students with physical, learning or other disabilities. If you have a disability and need classroom accommodations, please contact Services for Students with Disabilities, Phone: 607-777-2686 voice/TTY), Fax 607-777-6893. Email: [bjfairba@binghamton.edu](mailto:bjfairba@binghamton.edu).

## ACADEMIC HONESTY

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. All work submitted in this course must be original work. Sources must be properly cited. Any and all instances of academic dis-honesty will result in a failing grade (F) for the course.

## PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE OF READINGS

**Please note that I reserve the right to add or change readings with adequate prior notice.**

### Week 1 (January 19): Introduction

#### Required:

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. [entire]

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-2.

Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin. 1999. Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? NBER Working Paper No. 7195.

#### Recommended:

Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Lake, David. 2009. Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *Review of International Organizations* 4(3): 219-44.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization* 65(2): 311-41.

### Week 2 (January 26): Interests, Institutions, and International Trade I

#### Background:

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 & 2.

#### Required:

Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry. *Comparative Political Studies* 29(6): 689-717.

Fordham, Benjamin O., and Timothy J. McKeown. 2003. Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Votes on Trade Policy. *International Organization* 57 (3):519-49.

Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others? *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393-1430.

Ahlquist, John S., Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle. *International Organization* 68(1): 33-75.

Meckling, Jonas, and Llewelyn Hughes. 2017. Globalizing Solar: Global Supply Chains and Trade Preferences. *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2): 225-35.

Recommended:

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-37.

Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833-50.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bernard, Andrew B. et al. 2007. Firms in International Trade. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3): 105-30.

Kim, In Song. 2017. Political Cleavages Within Industry: Firm-Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 1-20.

### **Week 3 (February 2): The Search for Microfoundations**

#### **Required:**

Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy. 2014. Special issue of *International Interactions* 40(3). Read:

Pepinsky, Thomas B. Surveys, Experiments, and the Landscape of International Political Economy.

Tingley, Dustin. Survey Research in International Political Economy: Motivations, Designs, Methods.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable? *International Organization* 63(3): 533-57.

Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization* 71(S1): 1-30.

Owen, Erica, and Dennis P. Quinn. 2016. Does Economic Globalization Influence the US Policy Mood? A Study of US Public Sentiment, 1956–2011. *British Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 95-125.

Recommended:

Remaining articles in *International Interactions* special issue cited above.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Outgroup Anxiety. *International Organization* 63(3): 425-57.

Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade? *International Organization* 66(2): 311-28.

Bechtel, Michael M., Thomas Bernauer, and Reto Meyer. 2012. The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences. *Review of International Political Economy* 19(5): 837-66.

### **Week 4 (February 9): Interests, Institutions, and International Trade II**

#### **Required:**

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-98.

Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59 (1):157-93.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-84.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2008. Democracy and Trade Discrimination. *Journal of Politics* 70(4): 942-55.

Recommended:

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Trade and Variety of Democratic Institutions. *International Organization* 41(2): 203-23.

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49(3): 309-38.

McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hicks, Raymond, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin Tingley. 2014. Trade Policy, Economic Interests and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 106-17.

## **Week 5 (February 16): Trade & Global Structure**

### **Background:**

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 3 & 4.

### **Required:**

Krasner, Stephen. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics* 28(3): 317-47.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1986. *The World in Depression*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Chapter 14 ("An Explanation of the 1929 Depression").

Mansfield, Edward D., and Rachel Bronson. 1997. Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade. *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 94-107.

Fordham, Benjamin O. 2010. Trade and Asymmetric Alliances. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(6): 685-696.

Recommended:

Kindleberger, Charles. 1986. *The World in Depression*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

North, Douglas C. 1999. *Understanding the Process of Economic Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

## **Week 6 (February 23): Economic Interdependence & Conflict**

### **Required:**

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. [entire, focus especially on chapter 2]

McDonald, Patrick. 2004. Peace Through Trade or Free Trade? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4): 547-72.

Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998. Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy, and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 418-39.

Bearce, David, and Sawa Omori. 2005. How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace? *Journal of Peace Research* 42(6): 659-78.

Recommended:

Baldwin, David A. 1985. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Morrow, James D. 1999. How Could Trade Affect Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 481-89.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian M. Pollins (Eds.). 2003. *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

**Week 7 (March 2): International Institutions & International Trade**

**Required:**

Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55(4): 829-57.

Rose, Andrew, K. 2004. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98-114.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56(3): 477-513.

Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. *International Organization* 68(4): 877-911.

Recommended:

Kucik, Jeffrey. 2012. The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences over Trade Agreement Rules. *Economic & Politics* 24(2): 95-118.

Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.

Davis, Christina L. 2004. International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153-69.

**Week 8 (March 9): Exchange Rates**

**Required:**

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2014. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Recommended:

Eichengreen, Barry. 2008. *Globalizing Capital* (2nd Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2008. Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data. *IMF Staff Papers* 55: 417-444.

Walter, Stephanie. 2008. A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences. *International Organization* 62(3): 405-438.

Simmons, Beth A. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

McNamara, Kathleen R. 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Helleiner, Eric. 2003. *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Ahamed, Liaquat. 2009. *Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Meissner, Christopher. 2005. A New World Order: Explaining the International Diffusion of the Gold Standard, 1870-1913. *Journal of International Economics* 66(2): 385-406.

## **Week 9 (March 16): International Capital Mobility**

### **Background:**

Neely, Christopher. 1999. An Introduction to Capital Controls. *Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis Review* 81(6): 13-30.

### **Required:**

Quinn, Dennis, and Carla Inclan. 1997. The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 771-813.

Kastner, Scott L., and Chad Rector. 2005. Partisanship and the Path to Financial Openness. *Comparative Political Studies* 38(5): 484-506.

Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.

Quinn, Dennis, and Maria Toyoda. 2007. Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): 344-63.

Rosenbluth, Frances, and Ross Schaap. 2003. The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation. *International Organization* 57(2): 307-36.

### **Recommended:**

Goodman, John B., and Louis W. Pauly. 1993. The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. *World Politics* 46(1): 50-82.

Haggard, Stephen, and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World. *International Organization* 50(1): 35-68.

## **Week 10 (March 23): International Capital Mobility and Macroeconomic Policy**

### **Background:**

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2007. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 5.

### **Required:**

Avelino, George, David S. Brown, Wendy Hunter. 2005. The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 625-41.

Hays, Jude, Sean Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt, 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis. *International Organization* 59 (2):473-94.

Scheve, Kenneth. 2004. Public Inflation Aversion and the Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policymaking. *International Organization* 58(1): 1-34.

Hellwig, Timothy. 2014. Balancing Demands: The World Economy and the Composition of Policy Preferences. *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 1-14.

Recommended:

Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2010. Growth in a Time of Debt. NBER Working Paper No. 15639. Read in combination with: Cassidy, John. 2013. The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up. *The New Yorker* April 26.

Oatley, Thomas. 1999. How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (3): 1003-27.

**Week 11 (March 30): Foreign Direct Investment & Multinational Corporations**

**Required:**

Jensen, Nathan M. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-6.

Wellhausen, Rachel L. 2015. Investor–State Disputes: When Can Governments Break Contracts? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(2): 239-61.

Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 64(3): 389-409.

Recommended:

Dunning, John H., and Sarianna M. Lundan. 2008. *Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

Kerner, Andrew. 2014. What We Talk about When We Talk about Foreign Direct Investment. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(4): 804-15.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1994. International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation. *International Organization* 48: 559-93.

Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Developing Countries. *International Organization* 57(1): 175-211.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization* 60(4): 811-846.

Jensen, Nathan M., and René Lindstädt. 2013. Globalization with Whom: Context-Dependent Foreign Direct Investment Preferences. *Unpublished manuscript*.

**Week 12 (April 13): Migration**

**Required:**

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization. *World Politics* 67(1): 114-54.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. Public Attitudes toward Immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 17: 225-49.

Facchini, Giovanni, and Max Friedrich Steinhardt. 2011. What Drives U.S. Immigration Policy? Evidence from Congressional Roll Call Votes. *Journal of Public Economics* 95(7-8): 734-743.

Singer, David A. 2010. Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World. *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 307-323.

Recommended:

Aggarwala, Reena, Asli Demirgüç-Kuntb, and Maria Soledad Martínez Períab. 2011. Do Remittances Promote Financial Development? *Journal of Development Economics* 96(2): 255-64.



Leblang, David A., Jennifer Fitzgerald, and Jessica Teets. 2014. Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration. *World Politics* 66(3): 406-45.

Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

### **Week 13 (April 20): International Lending & Debt**

#### **Required:**

Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-6.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54(4): 737-773.

DiGiuseppe, Matthew, and Patrick E. Shea. 2015. Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders: Reassessing the “Democratic Advantage.” *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 557-70.

#### **Recommended:**

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. *International Organization* 57(1): 3-42.

Allee, Todd, and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization* 65(3): 401-432.

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2016. Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default. *International Organization* 70(2): 313-46.

Oatley, Thomas. 2010. Political Institutions and Foreign Debt in the Developing World. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 175-95.

### **Week 14 (April 27): Economic Development**

#### **Required:**

Bruton, Henry J. 1998. A Reconsideration of Import Substitution. *Journal of Economic Literature* 36(2): 903-936.

Cheng, Tun-jen. 1990. Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan. In Gereffi, Gary, and Donald L. Wyman (Eds.). *Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and Asia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [BL]

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115-131.

#### **Recommended [on the role of international financial institutions]:**

Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. *World Politics* 52(1): 38-75.

Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. 2000. The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth. *Journal of Development Economics* 62(2): 385-421.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2008. *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe*. Princeton University Press.

Stone, Randall. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. *International Organization* 62(4): 589-620.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2011. The United States Congress and IMF Financing, 1944-2009. *The Review of International Organizations* 6(3-4): 341-68.

Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. 2012. Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis. *International Organization* 66(2): 329-58.

### **Week 15 (Tentative Date May 8): Economic Crisis & Reform**

#### **Required:**

Oatley, Thomas. 2004. Why is Stabilization Sometimes Delayed? Re-evaluating the Regime Type Hypothesis. *Comparative Political Studies* 37(3): 286-312.

Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winners Take All. *World Politics* 50(2): 203-34. Schamis, Hector. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics* 51(2): 236-68.

Schamis, Hector. 1999. Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America. *World Politics* 51(2): 236-68.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 2005. Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 479-96.

Bechtel, Michael M., Jens Hainmueller, and Yotam Margalit. 2014. Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 835- 56.

#### **Recommended:**

Alesina, Alberto, and Alan Drazen. 1991. Why are Stabilizations Delayed? *American Economic Review* 81(5): 1170-88.

Chinn, Menzie D., and Frieden, Jeffrey A. 2011. *Lost Decades: The Making of America's Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.